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FORTHCOMING IN THE OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL (2022)
Animal Rights Activism and the Constitution: Are Ag-Gag Laws Justifiable Limits?
By Jodi Lazare*
Introduction
It is a troubling time to be an animal rights activist in Canada. In 2019, Alberta amended
its trespass legislation to create harsh penalties, including potential imprisonment, for trespassing
onto private property, and for obtaining permission to enter private property based on false
pretences.1 In 2020, the province prohibited obstruction of, or interference with, public
infrastructure, including highways and agricultural operations.2 In Ontario, since 2020, it is
likewise an offence to enter a place where animals are kept, without prior authorization; there, too,
entry based on false pretences is considered trespassing.3 Further, as in Alberta and, more recently,
Manitoba,4 it is an offence in Ontario to “stop, hinder, obstruct or otherwise interfere with a motor
vehicle transporting farm animals” 5 and to “interfere or interact with a farm animal being
transported by a motor vehicle without the prior consent of the driver of the motor vehicle.”6 In
effect, the trespass legislation, seemingly introduced in response to a number of instances where

*

DCL, McGill University; Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. This work was first
presented at the Emerging Scholars Workshop in Law, Animals & Society hosted by the Animals & Society
Research Initiative at the University of Victoria and supported by the Brooks Institute for Animal Rights & Policy. I
am deeply indebted to Maneesha Deckha for organizing the workshop, inviting me to be a part of it, and providing
invaluable feedback on the paper, as well as Doug Kysar, Justin Marceau, and Delciana Winders for their thoughtful
and detailed comments. I am also grateful to Jan Dutkiewicz and Troy Vettese for the opportunity to present this
work at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and the Animal Law and Policy Program at Harvard Law
School. The conversation that followed undoubtedly enriched this work. I am thankful for the excellent research and
editorial assistance of Hartwell Millett, Ella Murphy, Kinnar Power, and Kelsey Warr and for comments on earlier
drafts from Sarah Berger-Richardson, Elaine Brooks-Craig, Maureen Duffy, Angela Lee, Liam McHugh-Russell,
and Katie Sykes. Finally, the comments of two anonymous reviewers and the editorial team at the Osgoode Hall
Law Journal certainly enhanced the quality of this work, which was supported by an Insight Development Grant
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
1
Bill 27, Trespass Statues (Protecting Law-Abiding Property Owners) Amendment Act, 1st Sess, 30th Leg, Alberta,
2019 (assented to 5 December 2019), SA 2019, c 23 [Bill 27].
2
See Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, SA 2020, c C-32.7 [CIDA].
3
See Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020, S.O. 2020, c. 9 [Security from Trespass Act].
4
Bill 62, The Animal Diseases Amendment Act, 3d Sess, 42nd Leg, Manitoba 2020 (assented to 20 May 2021), SM
2021, c 53 [Bill 62].
5
Security from Trespass Act, supra note 3, s 6(1).
6
Ibid, s 6(2).
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animal rights activists occupied spaces on industrial animal farms and similar animal exploitation
businesses,7 makes it illegal to gain entry onto and to conduct undercover investigations of the
animal use industry. 8 Where the provisions related to transport are concerned, the legislation
effectively prohibits demonstrations on public roads, a regular activity of members of the “vegan
anti-speciest and animal-centric organisation” called the Animal Save Movement, 9 who protest
outside of slaughterhouses in an effort to “bear witness” to animal suffering and to spread
awareness of the violence of industrial animal farming.10
The laws in both Alberta and Ontario are said to be grounded in the general objective of
protecting the food supply. Specifically, the statutes purport to respond to concerns about risks to
the safety of farmers and their families from those that trespass onto their properties, risks to the
safety of animal transporters when protestors interfere with moving vehicles, and risks to animals
themselves, in terms of their safety and biosecurity. The aim of the legislation will be further
examined below, but for present purposes, the stated legislative objective illustrates its parallel
with American laws known as “ag-gag,” or agricultural gag laws, which, in their most recent
iteration, involve the “creative use of trespass laws to suppress information about public harms.” 11
American ag-gag legislation, aimed at limiting whistleblowing in the animal agriculture industry,
has taken many forms, such as anti-trespass laws, anti-defamation laws, and prohibitions on
recording and disseminating footage from industrial farms. 12 But all have had the same effect:

See Jodi Lazare, “Ag-Gag Laws, Animal Rights Activism, and the Constitution: What is Protected Speech?”
(2020) 58:1 Alta L Rev 83 at 84 (detailing a number of occupations and/or undercover investigations in Canada
between 2014 and 2020).
8
Note that while the legislation may have been spurred by animal activism on private property, in Alberta, it is not
limited in application to the agriculture industry.
9
Animal Save Movement, “About Us”, online: <https://thesavemovement.org/about/>.
10
See Maneesha Deckha, “The Save Movement and Farmed Animal Suffering: The Advocacy Benefits of Bearing
Witness as a Template for Law” (2019) 5 Can J Comparative & Contemporary L 77; Anita Krajnc, “Bearing
Witness: Is Giving Thirsty Pigs Water Criminal Mischief or a Duty” (2017) 23:2 Animal L 479.
11
Justin F Marceau, “Ag Gag Past, Present, and Future” (2015) 38:4 Seattle U L Rev 1317 at 1319.
12
See ibid.
7
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“they limit speech critical of the agricultural industry.”13 Importantly, a number of American
statutes, all of which contained prohibitions on entering an agricultural site based on a
misrepresentation, have been invalidated as unconstitutional limits on the First Amendment right
to free speech.14 As I suggest below, while the analysis differs, the same general reasoning
underlies the evaluation of the Canadian statutes’ validity under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.15
In an earlier article, I suggested that Canadian ag-gag laws constitute a limit to the Charter
right to freedom of expression. 16 In this article, I make the case that the legislation is not a
justifiable limit and is therefore of no force or effect, pursuant to section 52 of the Constitution
Act, 1982.17 In other words, I sketch out the analytical approach by subjecting the legislation to
the test established in R v Oakes for determining whether rights-infringing legislation may be
justified in the interests of the collective. 18 Specifically, my analysis focuses on the laws in force
in Alberta and Ontario, the first two jurisdictions to adopt ag-gag legislation. However, the
reasoning around section 1 should readily apply to parallel statutory developments such as
Manitoba’s law as it relates to transport, and any future legislation that might employ similar means
to achieve the same objectives. 19

13

Ibid.
Animal Legal Def Fund v Wasden, 878 F 3d 1184 (9th Cir 2018) [Wasden]; Animal Legal Def Fund v Herbert,
263 F Supp (3d) 1193, 1198 (D Utah 2017) [Herbert]; Animal Legal Def Fund v Reynolds, 353 F Supp (3d) 812 (SD
Iowa 9 Jan 2019) [Reynolds].
15
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
16
See Lazare, supra note 7.
17
Constitution Act, 1982, s 52(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
18
[1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200 [Oakes].
19
See e.g. Daphné Cameron, “Antispécisme: un groupe de travail pour empêcher d’autres infractions” (22 January
2020) online: La Presse <https://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/202001/22/01-5257866-antispecisme-un-groupe-detravail-pour-empecher-dautres-infractions.php?fbclid=IwAR1S_zNbuKwDl11aItBuEm2-PQwoD14FcUxL5Y6qppB6vIxMC6RDNpM96k%3E> (on the creation of a Quebec governmental task force to study how other
Canadian provinces are dealing with on-farm trespassers).
14
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Part 1 first explains the legislative background and summarizes my earlier argument that
the activities targeted by ag-gag legislation are a form of high-value, constitutionally protected
speech. Next, in keeping with the section 1 framework, Part 2 examines the contextual factors that
influence the rigour with which a court might approach the Oakes test. Part 3 then queries whether
the legislation has a pressing and substantial objective and suggests that while the government may
struggle to meet its burden, the legislation would, nevertheless, likely pass this step. Part 4 argues
that the legislation is not rationally connected to the legislative objective. Part 5 shows that the
provisions are not minimally impairing. Last, Part 6 suggests that the legislation is not
proportionate in its negative and positive impacts, independent of legislative purpose.
This article is primarily doctrinal in nature. It draws on legislation, case law, Hansard, and
relevant scholarship on constitutional rights interpretation. It is also partly comparative, drawing
as it does on the body of American scholarship on ag-gag legislation and the First Amendment and
looking to the American case law striking down similar laws. As with my earlier work on Canadian
ag-gag legislation, this article fills a gap in Canadian legal scholarship on the constitutional
dimensions of animal rights activism as well as the legality of limits on the activities of activists.
It should accordingly contribute to our understanding and interpretation of section 1 of the Charter
and the permissible scope of government interference with fundamental freedoms. To that end, it
might serve as a reminder that section 1 was conceived of as setting a high threshold to justify
rights violations—as an exception to the guaranteed rights and freedoms contained in the Charter,
and not the rule.
Further, the discussion of Alberta’s Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, adopted in
response to blockades and protests aimed at pipeline development, 20 coupled with the existence of

Jennifer Koshan, Lisa Silver, & Jonette Watson Hamilton, “Protests Matter: A Charter Critique of Alberta’s Bill
1” (9 June 2020), online (blog): ABlawg.ca <ablawg.ca/2020/06/09/protests-matter-a-charter-critique-of-albertas20
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similar legislative trends in other jurisdictions, 21 and the rise of climate protests,22 makes this work
relevant to activism, and the issues it responds to, beyond animal rights. This article comes at a
time when public attention to animal agriculture and meat production is at an all-time high, not
only with respect to the treatment of farmed animals, but also regarding working conditions for
humans in light of the high incidence of COVID-19 infections in slaughterhouses in the US and
Canada,23 and the demonstrated connections between industrial farming, animal confinement, and
the spread of zoonotic diseases.24 Indeed, it is no longer possible to turn a blind eye to the risks to
human health associated with industrial animal farming and the relationships between intensive
animal agriculture, the spread of zoonotic pathogens, and the increased microbial resistance that
results from the regular, prophylactic use of antibiotics in food production.25 Likewise, with
respect to our natural environment, the connection between industrial animal farming and
environmental harm is clear: “the animal agriculture industrial complex is one of the major causes

bill-1/>; Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 30th Leg, 2nd Sess (26 February 2020) at 12 [Alberta Hansard
(26 February 2020)].
21
See e.g US, SF 2235, An Act relating to criminal acts committed on or against critical infrastructure and
providing penalties, 87st Gen Assem, Reg Sess, Iowa, 2018 (enacted); US,HB 3557, An Act relating to civil and
criminal liability for engaging in certain conduct involving a critical infrastructure facility; creating criminal
offences, 2019, 86th Leg Assem, Reg Sess, Tex, 2019 (enacted); US, SB 2044, AN ACT to amend and reenact
section 12.1-21-06 of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to tampering with or damaging a critical
infrastructure facility or a public service; and to provide a penalty, 2019, 66th Leg Assem, Reg Sess, ND, 2019
(enacted).
22
See e.g. Sandra Laville & Johnathan Watts, “Across the globe millions join biggest climate protest ever” (21
September 2019), online: The Guardian <theguardian.com/environment/2019/sep/21/across-the-globe-millions-joinbiggest-climate-protest-ever>; Somini Sengupta, “Protesting Climate Change, Young People Take to the Streets in a
Global Strike” (20 September 2019), online: The New York Times <nytimes.com/2019/09/20/climate/global-climatestrike.html>.
23
Sarah Berger Richardson, “Worked to the Bone: COVID-19, the agrifood labour force, and the need for more
compassionate post-pandemic food systems” in Colleen M. Flood et al, eds, Vulnerable: The Law, Policy and Ethics
of COVID-19 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2020) 501.
24
See e.g. Damian Carrington, “Coronavirus: world treating symptoms, not cause of pandemics, says UN” (6 July
2020), online: The Guardian <theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/06/coronavirus-world-treating-symptoms-not-causepandemics-un-report>; United Nations Environment Programme, “Preventing the Next Pandemic: Zoonotic
Diseases and How to Break the Chain of Transmission” (2020), online (pdf): United Nations Environment
Programme <wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/32316/ZP.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>; Silviu
Petrova et al, “Post COVID-19: a solution scan of options for preventing future zoonotic epidemics” (2020) online
(pdf): OSF <osf.io/5jx3g/>.
25
See Romain Espinosa, Damian Tago, & Nicolas Treich, “Infectious Diseases and Meat Production” (2020) 76
Enviro & Resource Economics 1019.
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of human-induced global greenhouse gas emissions.”26 Those concerned about our changing
climate should be troubled by legislation that seeks to shield the activities of an industry that is a
significant contributor to drought, environmental degradation, 27 and global warming.28
Finally, this article makes a small but needed contribution to the growing Canadian
literature on agricultural exceptionalism, and the historic privileging of the agricultural industry
by legislators and policymakers. In Canada, while some research examines the “special sociolegal
place of agriculture within regimes governing … diverse policy fields,”29 the economic and
cultural importance of animal agriculture, and the “broader [legislative] trend of insulating
agriculture form the demands of a range of social justice imperatives,” merits further attention.30
While I do not explicitly engage in this discussion, the section 1 analysis draws on other examples
of exceptional treatment of the agricultural industry by legislators and courts in the context of
limiting the labour protections guaranteed by the Charter.31 Moreover, ag-gag legislation is, in
essence, about immunizing a specific, self-regulating, private industry from public scrutiny so as
to protect its economic viability.32

Núria Almiron, “Meat taboo: Climate change and the EU meat lobby” in Jason Hannan, ed, Meatsplaining: The
Animal Agriculture Industry and the Rhetoric of Denial (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2020) 163 at 163.
27
See Kathryn Gillespie, The Cow With Ear Tag #1389 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019) at 193
[Gillespie, #1389].
28
See generally Trevor J Smith, “Corn, Cows, and Climate Change: How Federal Agriculture Subsidies Enable
Factory Farming and Exacerbate U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions” (2019) 9:1 Washington J of Environmental L &
Policy 26; Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, “Does the Rule of Ecological Law Demand Veganism: Ecological Law,
Interspecies Justice, and the Global Food System” (2019) 43:3 Vermont L Rev 455.
29
Jessica Eisen, “Down on the Farm: Statuts, Exploitation, and Agricultural Exceptionalism” in Charlotte Blattner,
Kendra Coulter, & Will Kymlicka, eds, Animal Labour: A New Frontier of Interspecies Justice? (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2020) 139 at 143. For examples of Canadian agricultural exceptionalism in matters animal than the
treatment of animals see also Laura Alford & Sarah Berger Richardson, “Right-to-Farm Legislation in Canada:
Exceptional Protection for Standard Farm Practices” (2019) 50:1 Ottawa L Rev 131; Michael Trebilcock & Kristen
Pue, “The Puzzle of Agricultural Exceptionalism in International Trade Policy” (2015) 18:2 J Intl Econ L 233.
30
Eisen, supra note 29 at 142.
31
See Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94 at para 181 [Dunmore].
32
On a related note, a private member’s bill currently making its way through Parliament would extend exemptions
from the application of the carbon tax to fuels most frequently used by farmers. See Bill C-206, An Act to amend the
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (qualifying farming fuel), 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 [passed in the House in
June 2021 and reinstated following the 2021 election].
26
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1

Ag-Gag in Canada and the Constitutional Protection of Animal Rights Activism
This Part provides an overview of the legislation in question, in Alberta and Ontario.33 In

setting out the legislative landscape, this Part also summarizes the argument, set out in my previous
work, that animal rights activism is constitutionally protected speech and that by suppressing the
activities of activists, ag-gag legislation constitutes a clear limit to section 2(b) of the Charter, the
right to freedom of expression.
As explained, Alberta’s Bill 27 created harsh penalties, including fines of up to $10,000
for a first offence, $25,000 for a second, and up to $200,000 for a corporation, as well as potential
imprisonment for up to six months, for trespassing onto private property.34 The law also deems
entry under false pretences trespassing. 35 Bill 27 became law in December 2019. 36 Importantly,
while recent occupations by animal rights activists of industrial animal farms were a significant
driver of Bill 27,37 the trespass amendments were not limited to agricultural property. In fact, due
its broad wording and application, the Alberta amendments make it illegal to gain entry onto and,
indirectly, to conduct undercover investigations on any private property in the province, subjecting
offenders to those severe penalties.

33

Note, however, that Canadian ag-gag legislation is not limited to these jurisdictions. There is legislation
effectively prohibiting roadside vigils and slaughterhouse protests in force in Manitoba. See Bill 62, supra note 4,
the wording of which mirrors the transport provisions of Ontario’s law. Legislation has also been adopted in Prince
Edward Island. See Bill No 120, An Act to Amend the Animal Health Act, 1st Sess, 66th Leg, PEI, 2020 (assented to
December 2020), RSPEI 2020, c 86; Bill No 124, An Act to Amend the Animal Welfare Act, 1st Sess, 66th Leg, PEI,
2020 (assented to December 2020), RSPEI 2020, c 86. PEI’s legislation, while it indirectly limits animal rights
activism on farms, may not be as constitutionally problematic from a Charter perspective as the statues examined
here, but it nevertheless singles out one industry for special protection. Combined, all these laws evince a growing
legislative trend in Canada. I have chosen to focus on Alberta and Ontario as they were the first Canadian
jurisdictions to adopt these kinds of laws and, in doing so, created serious offences with troubling consequences.
34
See Bill 27, supra note 1.
35
Ibid.
36
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 30th Leg, 1st Sess (28 November 2019) [Alberta Hansard (28 November
2019)].
37
See the discussion below, in Part 3, on the legislative objective.
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That said, Alberta legislative developments in the form of trespass legislation also
specifically target, and protect, animal agriculture. Alongside Bill 27, Alberta adopted a new
regulation, the Biosecurity Regulation,38 under its Animal Health Act.39 Similar to Bill 27, the
regulation prohibits unauthorized entry into a “biosecurity area” where livestock is or will be
housed,40 subject to even higher fines than general trespass — up to $15,000 for a first offence,
and up to $30,000 and/or imprisonment for up to a year for a second.41 Corporations, for their part,
are liable to a fine of up to $200,000.42 The definition of “livestock” lists 29 different kinds of
animals used for commercial purposes, including “beef cattle,” “dairy cattle,” “poultry,” “swine,”
and fish kept pursuant to a “commercial fish culture licence.”43 Like Bill 27, where a person obtains
authorization to enter based on false pretences, that person is deemed to have entered without
authorization.44 Further, the regulation also indirectly prohibits, subject to the same penalties,
interference with transport vehicles carrying animals and interaction with the animals being
transported.45
Soon after the trespass prohibitions were adopted, in February 2020, the Alberta
government introduced Bill 1, the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act.46 That act purports to
“reinforce public safety” and to “strengthen penalties against those who would lawlessly trespass
or jeopardize public safety by seeking to block critical public infrastructure, including roadways,
railways, and other important infrastructure.” 47 Even broader than Bill 27, which is limited to

38

Alta Reg 185/2019 [Biosecurity Regulation].
SA 2007, c A-40.2.
40
Biosecurity Regulation, supra note 38, s 2.
41
Ibid, s 4(1)(a).
42
Ibid, s 4(1)(b).
43
Ibid, s 1(1)(b).
44
Ibid, s 2(5).
45
Ibid, ss 1(c), 2.
46
Supra note 2.
47
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 30th Leg, 2nd Sess, (25 February 2020) at 4.
39
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private property, the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act prohibits the wilful obstruction,
interruption, or interference with “any essential infrastructure,” 48 the definition of which includes
highways and agricultural operations. 49 As explained, like the Biosecurity Regulation, the impact
of the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, where animal rights activism is concerned, is to prohibit
roadside vigils by members of the Animal Save Movement and similar groups. Bill 1 was adopted
in June 2020.50
Ontario has seen a similar legislative move. In December 2019, the Ontario government
tabled Bill 156, the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2019.51 The Act makes
it an offence to enter an “animal protection zone” without authorization and deems entry based on
false pretences an offence. 52 An “animal protection zone” is a designated area on a farm, an
“animal processing facility,” or a “prescribed premises,” where “animals may be kept or
located.”53 The trespass provisions are meant to apply to unauthorized entry onto farms by animal
rights activists. Bill 156 also targets activism related to animals in transit; it is an offence to “stop,
hinder, obstruct or otherwise interfere with a motor vehicle transporting farm animals,”54 and to
“interfere or interact with a farm animal being transported by a motor vehicle without the prior
consent of the driver of the motor vehicle.”55 Like in Alberta, that provision is clearly aimed at the
activities of the Animal Save Movement, members of which regularly interact with animals on

48

CIDA, supra note 2, s 2.
Ibid, s 1.
50
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 30th Leg, 2nd Sess, (28 May 2020) at 869.
51
Bill 156, An Act to protect Ontario’s farms and farm animals from trespassers and other forms of interference
and to prevent contamination of Ontario’s food supply, 1st Sess, 42nd Leg, Ontario, 2020 (assented to 18 June
2020) SO 2020, c 9 [Bill 156 (ON)].
52
Ibid, s 5(2).
53
Ibid, s 2.
54
Ibid, s 6(1).
55
Ibid, s 6(2).
49
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trucks by talking to them, petting them, and giving them water on hot days.56 Bill 156 was adopted
in June 2020.
While the provisions related to interfering with a transport vehicle went into effect upon
royal assent, regulations were subsequently adopted to clarify the circumstances that amount to
entry under false pretences.57 Accordingly, a person who makes a false statement in order to gain
access to a farm, animal processing facility, or prescribed premises, commits an offence.58 The
same goes for individuals who make false statements in order to obtain employment.59 However,
the regulation contains two exceptions: one for “news media” journalists,60 and one for what it
terms “whistle-blowers.” According to the latter, where a person employed at a facility makes a
false statement, consent to enter “shall not be considered to have been obtained under false
pretences” if, among other things, the person “[obtains] information or evidence of harm to a farm
animal … and … the person discloses the information or evidence [of harm] to a police officer or
other authority as soon as practicable after obtaining the information or evidence.” 61
At first glance, this provision seems to imply that animal rights activists who make false
statements in order to gain employment on farms to document and disseminate animal abuse are
not captured by the trespass, or false pretences, provision. But a closer read makes clear that only
those individuals who actually document harm and immediately turn that information over to law
enforcement authorities are exempted from the commission of an offence. This is what is known
as a “quick report law,” or a “mandatory report law.” 62 While quick report laws may seem to
favour animal interests by ensuring that all abuse is reported right away, “in intent and effect these

56

See R v Krajnc, 2017 ONCJ 281 at para 2 [Krajnc].
See General, O Reg 701/20 [Reg 701/20].
58
Ibid, s 9.
59
Ibid, s 10.
60
Ibid, s 11
61
Ibid, s 12.
62
Marceau, supra note 11.
57
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laws impede journalistic and other undercover investigations of food producing facilities” by
making it impossible to document repeated and persistent patterns of animal abuse, and
undermining the point in going undercover at an animal use facility. 63 Moreover, the provision
states that unless and until the moment a person actually witnesses and documents animal abuse,
they are not covered by the exception. Thus, an individual who works at a facility but does not
witness abuse right away could be prosecuted, until they do. Only once they actually document
abuse could they meet the exception, and only provided they turn the information over to the
authorities. The exception, in other words, is extremely narrow, and does little to protect the work
of those committed to exposing the violence of industrial animal farming. With respect to
journalists, they are only exempted if their actions do not cause “harm to a farm animal, harm with
respect to food safety or harm to an individual.”64 The term “harm to an individual” is defined as
“emotional or psychological injury, including undue stress”—in other words, the documented
consequences of an individual being recorded abusing animals and, in some cases, fired as a
result,65 or where an owner is concerned, of the negative publicity associated with an exposé. This,
too, makes for a narrow exception.
As I have suggested, Canadian ag-gag laws constitute a clear limit to the Charter right to
freedom of expression, as it has been interpreted by courts and scholars.66 Prohibitions on
demonstrations on public roads and sidewalks outside of slaughterhouses and limits on specific
messages to gain access to a property are content-based restrictions and, accordingly, constitute
prima facie limits to section 2(b) of the Charter.67 Moreover, both activities relate to the underlying

63

Ibid at 1340, 1341.
Reg 701/20, supra note 57, s 11.
65
See Ted Genoways, The Chain: Farm, Factory, and the Fate of Our Food (New York: Harper, 2014) (discussing
the consequences of undercover investigations on individuals exposed as animal abusers at 135-143).
66
See Lazare, supra note 7.
67
See Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927, 58 DLR (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy].
64
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reasons why the Charter protects freedom of expression.68 As Maneesha Deckha explains, the
activities of the Animal Save Movement are an “exercise in truth telling.”69 The same might be
said of undercover investigations of industrial farm operations and the dissemination and viewing
of video and photographic evidence of cruel farming practices. Indeed, the Canadian public has a
right to know how its food is produced and to make consumer choices accordingly.70 Whereas
freedom of expression is about protecting “the individual’s freedom to communicate with
others,”71 prohibiting the activities of those who aim to make public the violence of industrial
animal farming cuts off a crucial and “extraordinarily effective” source of information, “critical to
public discourse,” and with the potential to reveal “the unsavory practices of a wealthy and
powerful industry to public scrutiny.”72
Animal rights activism is also political in nature; Kathryn Gillespie writes that “the act of
witnessing animals’ predicaments, and then sharing their stories, is a political act that resists the
erasure of individual animal lives, suffering, and deaths.”73 Timothy Pachirat, for his part, suggests
that uncovering animal suffering in hidden spaces like farms and slaughterhouses confronts
viewers with “a politics of sight, defined as organized, concerted attempts to make visible what is
hidden … in order to bring about social and political transformation.” 74 This kind of political

68

The underlying reasons are truth-telling, participation in political and democratic discourse, and individual selffulfilment and human flourish. See ibid.
69
Deckha, supra note 10 at 83.
70
See Kattenburg v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 1003; Marie-Claude Desjardins & Sabrina TremblayHuet, “The Consumers’ Right to Information about Animal Welfare: The Canadian Framework for Labelling of
Food Products of Animal Origin” in Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, Angela Lee & Nathalie Chalifour, eds, Food Law
and Policy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2019) 287; Richard Moon, “Limits on Constitutional Rights: The
Marginal Role of Proportionality Analysis” (2017) 50:1 Israel LR 49 (“Freedom of expression is instrumental to the
realization of social goods such as public knowledge” at 54) [Moon, “Limits”].
71
Moon, “Limits”, supra note 70 at 53.
72
See Alan K Chen & Justin Marceau, “High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment” (2015) 68:6 Vand
L Rev 1435 at 1466, 1456-1457 [Chen & Marceau, “High Value Lies”].
73
Kathryn Gillespie, “Witnessing Animal Others: Bearing Witness, Grief, and the Political Function of Emotion”
(2016) 31:3 Hypatia 572 at 576 on the “politics of food production”; see generally Gillespie, #1389, supra note 27.
74
Timothy Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2011) at 15.
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activity is particularly salient in the context of industry self-regulation and a lack of government
oversight where industrial animal agriculture in Canada is concerned. 75 Moreover, Canada has the
reputation of having the worst agricultural animal transport rules in the developed world, 76
something that animal rights activists seek to expose to the broader public in order to stimulate
legislative reform. 77 The activities of animal rights activists might also be seen as a form of
individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing. As I have written, “sharing one’s deep moral
convictions about animal use and exploitation, whether in the hopes of persuading others or simply
as a means of personal fulfilment, surely promotes individual autonomy and human flourishing.”78
Canadian ag-gag legislation targets not only the messages of animal rights activists, but
also the means of creating that message. The prohibition on entry based on false pretences—or the
fact that entry on false pretences is deemed trespass—also limits protected speech, both in purpose
and effect, as does the “quick report” provision of the Ontario regulation. As Alan K. Chen and
Justin Marceau suggest in their analysis of American ag-gag legislation, the provisions amount to
a prohibition on telling a lie in order to gain access to an animal-use facility.79 In other words, the
legislation dictates permissible and impermissible speech, thus constituting a content-based
restriction and a prima facie limit to section 2(b). The effect of the legislation is to prevent speech
precedent to the type of expression carried out by undercover activists—that is, expression that

See Lazare, supra note 7; Peter Sankoff, “Canada’s Experiment with Industry Self-Regulation in Agriculture:
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seeks to tell the truth, engages political discourse, and promotes the self-fulfilment and human
flourishing of activists.
Richard Moon explains that a meaningful commitment to freedom of expression depends
on the existence of conditions that enable individuals to make “reasoned and independent
judgments and have access to different opinions and reliable factual information.” 80 Limiting that
access, as ag-gag legislation does, necessarily impacts the rights of both animal rights activists, in
their efforts to obtain and share information, and members of the general public, who are prevented
from accessing that information. In short, in both purpose and effect, Canadian ag-gag laws amount
to an infringement of section 2(b) of the Charter by preventing members of the public from
producing and “[receiving] and [assessing] ideas and information without interference from the
state.”81 What remains to be determined is whether these limits are justifiable in the interests of a
free and democratic society—that is, under section 1 of the Charter.
2

Contextualizing Ag-Gag and the Section 1 Analysis
This Part briefly introduces the section 1 analysis as developed by the courts and

interpreted in the relevant literature and sets out the considerations that might inform a court’s
inquiry into the justifiability of ag-gag legislation and its inherent limit on Charter rights. Before
engaging in the balancing test established in R v Oakes,82 it is worth being explicit about what is
really at stake when Canadian courts carry out the proportionality test mandated by section 1 and
courts will often engage in this contextual inquiry before embarking on the Oakes analysis, which
“clarified the … interpretive methodology for Charter cases.”83 Importantly, in addition to the

Richard Moon, “Does Freedom of Expression Have a Future?” in Emmett MacFarlane, ed, Dilemmas of Freedom
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analytical steps, Oakes established “the need to tailor judicial review to the unique context of each
case.”84 Context is the “touchstone of section 1.”85
Rights adjudication and constitutional challenges do not take place in a vacuum; evaluating
limits on expression typically entails a judgment about the value or harm inherent in a particular
social practice.86 Indeed, the rigour with which courts will examine a restriction on fundamental
freedoms will often depend on a number of factors, including the nature of the right being limited. 87
The speech at issue here—speech by animal rights activists and advocates—may relate to what
members of the public choose to buy at the grocery store. It is not, however, profit-driven speech,
which lies “far from the ‘core’ of freedom of expression values,” and which may be easier to justify
limiting.88 Rather, despite the legislation’s purported aims, the background makes it clear that the
message targeted is both political and informational in nature; as discussed above, animal rights
activism can inform deeply personal decisions, such as what foods to eat, what to feed one’s
children, and

ultimately, what ethical relationships with animals look like. 89 In terms of

informational value, the issues highlighted by activists might drive consumers to ask what kinds
of animal husbandry practices they want to support with their dollars. Where politics are
concerned, the images revealed by activists might influence observers to think about how the law
governs the treatment of farmed animals, 90 and how lawmakers might do better. The value of this
speech to members of the public means that limits on it should be more difficult to justify. As the
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Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted, 91 “political speech lies at the core of section 2(b) … and
laws which restrict it do not warrant any deference.” 92
In a similar vein, the type of legislation under review also affects the court’s approach.
Constitutional adjudication always involves some “form of interest-balancing,”93 but where
legislation aims to balance the competing interests of different segments of the population—animal
rights activists, agricultural producers, and the general public—governments will typically benefit
from more leeway in constitutional review.94 In other words, the polycentric nature of the
legislation could suggest a more flexible standard of justification and an easier onus on the
government, which bears the burden of proving that legislative limits to rights are justified. 95 This
would not, however, absolve the government of the need to produce clear evidence at each stage
of the Oakes test. While the standard may be less demanding in non-criminal cases, Oakes set out
a “stringent standard of justification” for limiting fundamental freedoms, 96 and made “empirics
central to every stage of the Oakes test.”97 As Justice McLachlin (as she then was) confirmed more
than a decade later, justification under section 1 involves a “reasoned demonstration” that the
impact of a law on Charter rights is proportionate to its objectives and means of achieving them. 98
“In short, s. 1 is an exercise based on the facts of the law at issue and the proof offered of its
justification, not on abstractions.”99 Thus, section 1 involves an inquiry into the facts and the
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evidence proffered by the government in support of those facts. With respect to ag-gag legislation,
it demands evidence of the reasonableness of limiting activism in the ways the governments of
Alberta and Ontario have chosen.
Justification of Charter limits is a question of balance. Where freedom of expression is
limited, the proportionality test under section 1 seeks to establish the line between engagement, or
permissible speech, and manipulation, or the type of speech that may be justifiably restricted.100
The ultimate question for courts here is “whether the expression appeals to audience judgment or
whether it instead aims to manipulate or influence the audience at a non-cognitive level,”101 the
latter being the type of speech that the government may rightfully limit; the line between the two
will be drawn in different places by different people.102 The remainder of this article is premised
on the belief that the expression limited by Canadian ag-gag legislation does not rise to the level
of manipulation, but rather, makes a meaningful contribution to public discourse on a matter of
observable fact. Indeed, more than engagement or permissible speech, animal rights activism, as
targeted by the legislation in question, is the kind of speech that the Charter is meant to protect—
unpopular perhaps, but crucial, in the eyes of the speakers, to truth-seeking, democratic discourse,
and individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing.103 In the final balance, it is doubtful that the
objectives of ag-gag legislation, which the next Part explores, outweigh these fundamental
interests.
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3 Protecting Industrial Animal Agriculture and Limiting Expression are not Pressing and
Substantial Objectives
The first step of the Oakes test is an assessment of whether the government has
demonstrated104 that the limit to rights is “pressing and substantial.”105 For Chief Justice Dickson,
a pressing and substantial objective is one that “furthers the values of the ‘free and democratic
society’ referred to by the text of section 1.” 106 In the years following Oakes, the test was a stringent
one, with rights limitations only being justifiable in exceptional situations. 107 With time, however,
the standard was loosened; legislative objectives need only be “valid” or “sufficiently important”
to withstand section 1 scrutiny. 108 The current concept of a proper objective has been described as
one that “is intended to realize societal objectives that are in line with the values of the state in
general and are sensitive to the place of human rights in the general social arrangement.”109 Thus,
a law will meet the first requirement of Oakes where it aims to achieve objectives in line with
social values.
Since Oakes, the debate around the need for a pressing and substantial objective may centre
less on the standard of justification and more on the requirement of compelling evidence. Stated
otherwise, given the empirical nature of the section 1 analysis, it is not enough for a government
to merely assert, in the abstract, that legislation aims to achieve a particular aim or policy outcome.
Rather, “[in] determining whether the objective of the law is sufficiently important to be capable
of overriding a guaranteed right, the court must examine the actual objective of the law.” 110 Indeed,
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“rights can only be justifiably limited in response to concrete, precise and real problems or harms
whose existence can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a court through the normal trial
process.”111 The following paragraphs unpack the objectives of Canadian ag-gag legislation and
suggest that where some of the stated objectives are concerned, there is little evidence supporting
the purported harms. However, as legislation rarely fails at the first stage of the Oakes test,112 the
main purpose of this part is to identify the legislative objectives, as they inform the later parts of
the analysis.
The speed with which Alberta’s Bill 27 (the trespass amendments) was tabled and adopted
means that legislative intent may be difficult to uncover. But the legislative debates are
nevertheless illuminating with respect to the objectives, two of which were made express by
members of the legislative assembly. Bill 27 was introduced by the Hon. Doug Schweitzer,
Minister of Justice, who made clear from the outset that the legislation aims, firstly, to protect
property owners from a perceived increase in rural crime: “…we need to make sure that Albertans
have the strongest possible property rights here in the province of Alberta. It’s integral to make
sure that property rights are respected, that landowners can feel safe in their homes knowing that
law-abiding citizens are protected.”113 Hansard suggests, moreover, that Bill 27 is about protecting
a certain category of property owners: “It’s going to protect our farmers. It’s going to protect our
homeowners across this province.”114 Second, Bill 27, despite that it applies to non-agricultural
property as well, is expressly about protecting biosecurity and the safety of Alberta’s food
system;115 the debates acknowledge that entry onto animal farms without the proper precautions
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could create a risk of transferring diseases, such as swine flu, between animals and humans, and
from farm to farm.116 Finally, while not an explicitly stated objective, an opposition MLA raised
the idea that in addition to property and biosecurity, Bill 27 might in fact be an “effort to … stifle
dissent.”117 Before turning to the validity of each of these objectives, it is worth looking at the
similar goals of Alberta’s Bill 1, as well as those of Ontario’s parallel legislation.
The leadup to Bill 1, now the Critical Infrastructure Defence Act,118 made its objectives
quite clear. The Bill appears to have been tabled in response to public protests, in the form of
blockades of pipelines and railways, in support of Indigenous communities affected by proposed
pipeline construction.119 Hansard confirms these goals: referring to infrastructure being barricaded,
and prosperity being impaired by “by green zealots and eco-radical thugs,” the legislation aims to
“discourage the illegal protesters, who are scaring away investors, shutting down a large part of
our economy, and potentially jeopardizing the public safety of the workers on rail lines and critical
infrastructure projects.”120 The principal goal of Bill 1, in other words, is to “[take] action to defend
our vital economic interests.”121
Bill 156 in Ontario had similar objectives, both stated and unstated. The statute’s original
title—An Act to protect Ontario’s farms and farm animals from trespassers and other forms of
interference and to prevent contamination of Ontario’s food supply—reveals its primary

116

See Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 30th Leg 1st Sess, (25 November 2019) at 2524 [Alberta Hansard
(25 November 2019)]; See also Alberta Hansard (28 November 2019), supra note 36 at 2639 (referring to the
economic costs of biosecurity breaches).
117
Alberta Hansard (28 November 2019), supra note 36 at 2640.
118
CIDA, supra note 2.
119
See Kieran Leavitt, “‘Not in our backyard’: Alberta Wet’suwet’en rail blockade meets stiff opposition and shuts
down after injunction granted” (19 February 2020), online: The Star <thestar.com/news/canada/2020/02/19/newwetsuweten-rail-blockade-pops-up-in-the-heart-of-canadas-oil-country.html>; Koshan, Silver & Hamilton, supra
note 20; Matthew Black, “Alberta bill targeting blockade protesters passed into law” (17 June 2020) online: CTV
News <edmonton.ctvnews.ca/alberta-bill-targeting-blockade-protesters-passed-into-law-1.4988429>.
120
Alberta Hansard (26 February 2020), supra note 20 at 12.
121
Ibid at 15.

20

FORTHCOMING IN THE OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL (2022)
objectives: the protection of farmers and of the food supply. Hansard confirms these objectives,
but also raises additional ones, such as balancing the security of farmers, who sometimes feel
unsafe when activists trespass onto their properties, the food supply, and the “right of people to
participate in legal protests.” 122 Further, the legislative debates demonstrate that, like Bill 1 in
Alberta, the Ontario statute aims to respond to industry concerns,123 and to protect economic
interests in agriculture. At second reading, the Hon. Ernie Hardeman, Minister of Agriculture,
Food, and Rural Affairs, stressed the importance of “Ontario’s diverse agriculture sector [as] a
significant economic driver….”124 Accordingly, “[it’s] important that we recognize the important
role that agri-food businesses play in regional economic development, as they contribute to our
broader economy.”125 The legislation thus demonstrates the “government’s commitment to protect
the health and safety of [the] agri-food sector….”126 As another majority MPP stated, “protecting
agriculture is a non-partisan issue. It’s something that we are all supportive of. We all support our
farmers. We all support our agriculture industry.” 127
The legislative objectives apparent from the debates, however, do not end there. While
majority MPPs emphasized the express objectives, opposition members pointed to a less obvious
legislative goal, that of silencing animal rights activists, protesters, and undercover investigators.
The opposition Critic, Agriculture and Food, Rural Development, John Vanthof, suggested that
the legislation is “trying to limit the impact of people who are totally opposed to animal
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agriculture” as well as investigative reporting,128 and that it “could be perceived as antiwhistleblower.”129 He also pointed out that the “retroactive trespassing part”—that is, the fact that
an individual who enters a facility under false pretences is deemed to have trespassed—“has
nothing to do with biosecurity.”130 More about this absence of connection between the stated
objectives and the impugned measure will be said in the next Part, in the context of the requirement
for a rational connection. Likewise, another opposition MPP highlighted the history of ag-gag
legislation in the United States, where similar laws, “designed to silence whistle-blowers who
reveal animal abuses on industrial farms,” 131 and which “effectively cut off an important source of
public information and a driver of policy change,” 132 have been struck down as contrary to the
First Amendment right to free speech. 133 Another opposition member suggested that the purpose
is political—that the government wants to “employ wedge issues to try and pit farmers against
animal rights activists” and knows that the legislation will be challenged in court.134 Thus,
Canadian ag-gag legislation looks a lot like its American counterpart, the objectives of which have
been unpacked in the relevant literature; in short, the history, effects, and context of the legislation
“all evince a desire to target animal rights activists and sympathetic journalists and subject their
political speech to disfavored treatment.” 135
The question, then, for each of these apparent purposes, is whether they accord with social
values, and whether the government presents “evidence of the real, concrete harms of [the]
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prohibited speech.”136 As discussed above, “governments can only justifiably limit constitutional
rights to respond to real problems.”137 Certainly, governments may protect property interests, as
they do through both provincial and federal trespass legislation. 138 The inquiry here, however, is
whether the legislation responds to a concrete problem at the level of privacy interests. The
legislative debates suggest that farmers have repeatedly expressed concern and anxiety about
unauthorized entry onto their properties, which house not only their barns but also their homes.139
Undoubtedly, human safety is a legitimate government concern. But the American experience with
similar statutes said to protect private property suggests that the “privacy intrusion narrative is
oftentimes a canard.”140 In the legislative committee hearings prior to the adoption of Bill 156, 141
an animal rights activist with experience trespassing onto farms to occupy barns and document
animal suffering explained that activists do not threaten farmer safety:
Animal rights activists are only concerned about exposing the conditions that
animals endure. Farmers’ homes are very rarely near any animal agriculture
operation due to the strong stench of ammonia from the sheds. … [We] only enter
the barns where the animals are. We do not need or want to see any human when
we’re going into these places. … [The] farms are not next to any houses, and if
the houses are nearby, then we choose not to go there. We are only interested in
the animals. … We are not harming anyone. 142
This testimony supports the idea, set out by Marceau and Chen, that “[the] privacy interests in the
open areas of a large, commercial workplace are quite different than the privacy interests in one’s
bathroom or living room.”143 Thus, while there may be societal consensus around the value of
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protecting the privacy of farmers and farm families, the evidence before the legislature appeared
to undermine the suggestion that farmer safety and intrusions on their privacy interests are a “real,
concrete [harm].”144
Protecting biosecurity and, ultimately, the food system, may, for its part, constitute a
pressing and substantial objective in the context of the section 1 analysis, even though, as with the
privacy objective, the government may have difficulty meeting its evidentiary burden. Protecting
biosecurity in the interests of a safe food system certainly aligns with societal objectives and state
values. The leadup to Canadian ag-gag legislation, however, potentially undercuts the pressing
nature of the need for these biosecurity measures. In 2017, an Ontario Provincial Court judge
rejected the Crown’s argument that the activities of the Animal Save Movement—bearing witness
to animal suffering during transport and offering pigs water on hot days—pose any kind of risk to
the animals, or to the food they are destined to become.145 These of course, are the activities
targeted by the transport-related provisions in both provinces.146 Likewise, the testimony of the
same animal rights activist before the committee studying Ontario’s legislation casts similar doubt
on the risks to biosecurity by farm trespassers.147 In her words, “[we] wear full biosecurity gear.
We are not harming anyone.”148 This testimony aligns with the observation, on the part of
American feminist geographer Kathryn Gillespie, that “biosecurity [is] more regularly used as an
excuse than a legitimate concern,”149 and that “biosecurity is a complicated and ambiguous
buzzword used in supporting the denial of access to spaces of agricultural production under the
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real or perceived guise of food safety and disease prevention.” 150 Indeed, Gillespie’s conclusions
about biosecurity were informed by the experience of seeing dairy farm workers themselves
“arrive to work and complete their jobs with no protective gear or precautionary measures to
prevent the spread of disease to the animals”—151 and this, despite repeatedly being denied access
to farms in the name of biosecurity. Nevertheless, and despite these apparent weaknesses in the
government’s case, a court would likely accept the protection of biosecurity as a pressing and
substantial objective. Indeed, the threshold for demonstrating the required objective is notoriously
low.152 Further, as seen, when the government is mediating between the interests of different
groups, it may be “afforded a margin of appreciation to form legitimate objectives.” 153 Moreover,
common sense dictates that protecting the food system from contaminants, regardless of the
necessity or efficacy of those protections, is a worthwhile government objective. 154 For that reason,
and based the history of section 1, a court would likely find the purported protection of food safety
is enough to pass this first stage of the test.
The same cannot however be said for the objective of prohibiting public protests, as
Alberta’s Critical Infrastructure Defence Act, Alberta’s Biosecurity Regulation, and Ontario’s
Security from Trespass Act do, or for the apparent objective of stifling activism and information
sharing—the effect of prohibiting entry under false pretences. Each of these activities—public
protests, demonstrations, and dissemination of information about the brutal treatment of animals
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in the food system—is protected by the Charter, under sections 2(b) and 2(c).155 Peter Hogg wrote:
“… an objective cannot provide the basis for s. 1 justification if the objective is incompatible with
the values entrenched by the Charter of Rights.”156 As in the United States, “[preventing] the public
from obtaining this information precludes the dissemination of much needed safety-related
information; this cannot be a compelling state interest.”157 Canadian ag-gag legislation interferes
with the public’s right to information about the nature of industrial farming practices—information
that enables participation in democratic life and is a means of truth-seeking and individual selffulfilment. Even with a heightened level of deference to complex policymaking, limiting these
activities, which go to the heart of the right to freedom of expression, is not a valid legislative
objective.
Finally, in both Alberta and Ontario, lawmakers have been clear about the economic
objectives of all three relevant statutes and the goal of protecting the agricultural industry in
particular.158 Agriculture is, uncontroversially, an important industry in Canada.159 At the same
time, the Canadian Charter has not been interpreted to protect economic rights, 160 including the
right to earn a living,161 or the right to property.162 These limits to the scope of Charter protection
must be taken into account when weighing such interests against the protection of a right as
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fundamental as freedom of expression. Indeed, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, dissenting in Dunmore v
Ontario (AG), rejected the invitation to find that “a policy geared to enhance the economic wellbeing of private enterprises” was sufficiently important to meet the first step of the Oakes test.163
In the same decision, however, the majority reasoned that “the protection of the family farm is a
pressing enough objective to warrant the infringement of s. 2(d) of the Charter.” 164 More generally,
the fact that “agriculture occupies a volatile and highly competitive part of the private sector
economy [and] that it experiences disproportionately thin profit margins” made its protection a
pressing and substantial reason to limit Charter rights.165 This approach aligns with the historic
privileging of industrial agriculture, insofar as it garners exceptional treatment in the form of
regulatory carve-outs where things like worker and animal protections are concerned.166
Still, it is worth highlighting that decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada validating
the economic interests of private actors, or industry, as a pressing and substantial legislative
objective are sparse, and seemingly limited to the labour context where associational rights under
section 2(d) might conflict with the economic interests of private employers. Whether those
interests should in fact constitute a justifiable reason to limit rights remains unsettled, with some
authors suggesting they should not. Steven Barrett and Benjamin Oliphant write that “courts
should be wary of succumbing to the temptation to justify limitations on strike action on the basis
of economic harm or inconvenience.”167 And, beyond the labour context, “[while] the protection
of the rights or freedoms of third parties may in some circumstances constitute a pressing and
substantial objective for the limitation on the exercise of Charter rights or freedoms, we would
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propose that mere inconvenience or economic disruption rarely will.” 168 Moreover, in Dunmore,
while it acknowledged the erosion of “family farms” as typical of Ontario agriculture, the
majority’s reasoning on section 1 applied to these smaller farms and their “unique and noncommercial way of life,” and not to “corporate farming and agribusiness.”169
Today, large, corporate agri-business is quickly replacing the traditional family farm in
Canada with so-called “intensive livestock operations,” 170 similar to the well-known, and
problematic, “concentrated animal feedlot operations,” or CAFOs, in the United States.171 In recent
years, researchers documented the “increasing concentration of power and resources in the hands
of agribusiness firms and financial interests [and] the marginalization of small farmers” as two of
the “dominant trends in the corporate food regime in Canada.”172 And, almost two decades ago,
others observed that the North American “livestock industry, particularly the swine industry, has
undergone dramatic concentration in the last twenty years.”173 It seems clear that the bucolic family
farm envisioned by the Supreme Court is becoming a relic of the past; it is not what legislators
seem to want to protect in the guise of ag-gag legislation. The major economic interests that
motivate Canadian ag-gag legislation, the apparent distinction between family farms and industrial
agribusiness, and the uncertainty around the pressing and substantial nature of economic interests
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as a general matter should in fact lead a court to reason differently than in Dunmore, on the
question of pressing and substantial objective.
Nevertheless, the rarity with which laws are struck down based on the absence of a valid
objective, combined with the high level of deference granted to governments at this first stage of
the Oakes test, mean that the legislation would likely pass this step. It is therefore important to be
clear about what objective exactly will ground the remainder of the analysis. The preceding
paragraphs set out the legislative objectives of ag-gag legislation generally. But the section 1 test
asks courts to evaluate specific rights-infringing provisions, where that is the case. 174 The focus
here, then, should be on the limits to expression inherent in the prohibitions on entry under false
pretences, which purportedly aim to prevent the introduction of biosecurity hazards by trespassers
and to protect private property and farmer safety. For their part, the prohibitions on interfering
with animals in transport seek to prevent the introduction of contaminants in the food supply. The
latter prohibitions, which amount to banning public protests, also aim to protect the industry more
broadly. Assuming that protecting farmers, the agriculture industry, and the safety of the food
system are in fact pressing and substantial objectives, the next question is whether the limits to
section 2(b) are rationally connected to these objectives.
4 The Legislation is Not Rationally Connected to the Legislative Objective
The requirement for a rational connection between the offending measure and the
legislative objective forms the first part of the proportionality stage of the Oakes test. The question
here is whether “the restrictive measure is effective in advancing its pressing and substantial
purpose.”175 As the Court described the question in Oakes itself, the impugned measure “must be
carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. [It] must not be arbitrary, unfair or based
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on irrational considerations.”176 As with the requirement for a pressing and substantial objective,
few laws have been invalidated based on the absence of a rational connection. 177 But, as Hogg
observed, it does happen.178 In Ford v Quebec (AG),179 “[the] Court held that while the evidentiary
record was sufficient to demonstrate the importance of the government’s objective [the survival of
the French language], there was a complete absence of evidence on the critical question of whether
‘the requirement of the use of French only is either necessary for the achievement of the legislative
objective or proportionate to it.’” 180 The remainder of this part suggests that where Canadian aggag legislation is concerned, there is likewise little evidence that the limits on expression are
rationally connected to the legislative objectives identified above, or at least to those likely to be
accepted as valid by a court.
As seen, there are several objectives being pursued by different parts of the legislation. The
prohibitions on entry onto a property or biosecurity area (in Alberta) and an agricultural facility
(in Ontario) aim to prevent the introduction of biosecurity hazards into the food system by
trespassers and to protect private property and farmer safety. The difficulty here is that trespassers,
as a general matter, do not typically enter properties on false pretences. Rather, they simply enter
with no prior authorization, as per both the ordinary and legal meanings of trespass.181 Indeed, as
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highlighted above in one activist’s testimony to the Ontario legislative committee studying Bill
156,182 animal rights activists trespassing onto farms typically go out of their way to avoid
encountering other people, in effect depriving themselves of the opportunity to claim they are
entering on any pretence other than their activism. There is no connection, in other words, between
the rights limitation—the prohibition on telling a lie in order to gain entry—and the stated
objectives.
Thus, the limit on expression seems to be aimed at something else altogether—a situation
where an individual, such as an investigative journalist or an animal rights advocate posing as an
employee,183 may lie to gain entry onto a farm in order to document repeated animal abuses and
disseminate their findings. Indeed, such undercover investigations have been at the root of some
of the biggest, and most damaging, exposés of animal cruelty on industrial farms,184 and the
adoption of ag-gag legislation is often a response to this kind of damaging publicity. In Idaho, for
example, ag-gag legislation was a direct response to an undercover investigation by Mercy For
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Animals, which revealed horrific cruelty on a dairy farm.185 That law has since been struck down
as a breach of the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech. 186 The issue, at the level of
rational connection, then, is the “complete absence of evidence” that these types of activities
constitute a threat to biosecurity or farmer safety.187 This absence of connection was precisely what
motivated another American court to strike down similar legislation. Judge Gritzner, of the US
District Court, Southern District of Iowa, reasoned: “Defendants have produced no evidence that
the prohibitions [on entry under false pretences] are actually necessary to protect perceived harms
to property and biosecurity. … Defendants have made no record as to how biosecurity is threatened
by a person making a false statement to get access to, or employment in, an agricultural production
facility.”188 The idea, of course, is that an animal rights activist who obtains employment in order
to document farm practices will be trained, like any other employee, and expected to adhere to
biosecurity protocols.189 Trespassers are distinct from those who enter on false pretences, and
while they may or may not introduce contaminants onto farms—although there is little evidence
that they do—that is irrelevant to the relationship between prohibiting entry on false pretences and
the stated legislative objectives, which seem to have no connection at all.
Similarly, there is little evidence of any relationship between the prohibitions on interacting
with animals in transport and the stated objective of protecting the food supply. As discussed above
with respect to the pressing nature of the goal of protecting food safety, the legal system has
previously rejected, based on an absence of evidence, the suggestion that members of the Animal
Save Movement, who protest on public roads and bear witness to the suffering of animals as they
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are trucked off to slaughter, pose any biosecurity hazards to the animals that they attempt to
comfort and, in turn, to the food system.190 In R v Krajnc, Anita Krajnc, the founder of the Animal
Save Movement, was charged with the crime of mischief when she gave water to pigs on a
transport truck on a hot summer day, as she and fellow protestors regularly did. 191 At trial, the
Crown suggested that Ms. Krajnc “gave ‘an unknown substance / possible contaminant’ to the pigs
thereby creating a risk that the slaughterhouse would refuse to take them.” 192 The judge rejected
this theory, based on an absence of evidence that either the truck driver or the slaughterhouse
showed any actual concern about a possible contaminant:
[71] Crown counsel argued that Ms. Krajnc created a risk that the slaughterhouse
would refuse the load on the basis that they might be contaminated. The farmer
and the truck driver both testified that this possibility caused them very real
concern.
[72] Again I find that this is completely contradicted by the evidence.
[73] Protesters had given water to pigs before. The driver was aware of this. The
slaughterhouse was aware of this. Despite this, the slaughterhouse had never
refused to accept a load of pigs for that reason.
[74] As I stated above they did not reject that particular load on that particular
day.193
A finding by one trial judge is not a conclusive statement on the evidentiary basis for Canadian
ag-gag legislation. But it is telling that the only judicial pronouncement on the relationship between
slaughterhouse protests and the risk of contaminating the food supply involves a categorical
rejection of the purported connection. Justice Harris’s reasoning in R v Krajnc seriously
undermines the existence of the rational connection required of constitutionally justifiable rights
infringements.
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As discussed, all of the offending provisions, and ag-gag legislation generally, are related
to the broader objective of protecting and supporting the agriculture industry. Assuming that
protecting the economic interests of private actors constitutes a pressing and substantial reason to
limit fundamental rights, which remains unclear, this objective poses further problems at the level
of rational connection. As suggested in the legislative debates,194 by MPPs studying Bill 156 at
committee,195 and by research out of the United States and Canada,196 ag-gag legislation may do
more harm than good to the reputation of industrial animal agriculture. Rather than protecting the
industry, the removal of transparency inherent in ag-gag legislation, which shields the industry
from public scrutiny, has been shown to erode public trust in farmers and to increase support for
animal welfare.197 Paradoxically, then, by undermining public confidence in animal agriculture,
ag-gag legislation achieves the exact opposite of the legislative objective—instead of protecting,
it risks harming the industry and the economic interests of farmers. In other words, it is entirely
ineffective in advancing its purpose and accordingly does not meet the requirement that rightslimiting legislation be rationally connected to its objective.
5 The Legislation is Not Minimally Impairing
The test for minimal impairment, the second stage of proportionality, has been restated a
number of times in the years since Oakes. In 2015, Hogg described it as the “requirement of least
drastic means. … The idea is that the law should impair the right no more than is necessary to
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accomplish the desired objective….” 198 In practice, however, courts do not typically look for the
“least intrusive” measure, but rather, seek to ensure that the “challenged measure … only [impairs]
Charter rights as little as is reasonably possible and [ask] whether there is some reasonable
alternative scheme.”199 Given that courts regularly defer to governments balancing different
interests, the question here is often “whether it could be said that the government had a ‘reasonable
basis’ for concluding that that it had impaired the right as little as possible.” 200 That said, as
highlighted above, where the speech being limited is political in nature, the degree of deference
afforded by the court will be low.201 Importantly, given the rarity with which laws fail at the
previous two steps, minimal impairment “has turned out to be the heart and soul of s. 1
justification.”202 Moreover, as with the other parts of the Oakes test, the evidence is paramount in
determining whether the limits are among a range of reasonable options for the government to
meet its desired objectives. The following paragraphs suggest that ag-gag legislation does not meet
this standard and accordingly fails the minimal impairment test.
There are reasonable alternatives, with lesser impacts on rights, that would achieve the
objectives of protecting biosecurity, farmer safety, and the overall integrity of the food system. In
fact, it is possible to achieve each of these objectives without limiting freedom of expression at all,
especially given the tenuous connection, demonstrated above, between the restriction on speech
and the objectives. The legislation, in both Alberta and Ontario, increases existing penalties for
trespassing onto private property or an agricultural facility, respectively, and prohibits entry on
false pretences by deeming it a trespass. The penalties (fines and/or jail in Alberta and fines in
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Ontario), and the legislation more generally, are meant to dissuade activists from trespassing onto
farms and occupying animal enclosures, in order to achieve the broader objectives.203 As set out
already, however, it is not clear how the prohibition on entry under false pretences relates to these
objectives. It stands to reason, then, that these objectives can be achieved without limiting
expression. Indeed, the most efficient way to dissuade trespassing in order to promote biosecurity
and farmer safety seems to be by prohibiting trespassing. And while it is not for courts to impose
what they view as the best solution to a particular policy problem,204 it is incumbent on them to
hold governments to account when legislation limits rights unnecessarily. Here, prohibiting
trespass alone, without restricting expression, would achieve the legislative goal, and would limit
freedom of expression less than the false pretences provisions. Accordingly, these provisions limit
rights more than necessary, and thus fail the minimal impairment test.
The protection of biosecurity can also be achieved through less impairing measures that do
not limit high-value speech. For example, at the federal level, Bill C-205,205 which died on the
order table when the 2021 election was called, would have amended the federal Health of Animals
Act so as to prohibit the introduction of a “disease or toxic substance” into a place where animals
are kept.206 In other words, the amended legislation would protect against biosecurity threats by
limiting exposure to contaminants and not by limiting speech. Surely, this bill demonstrates the
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existence of alternative means of achieving the principal legislative objective of ag-gag legislation
that are less harmful to fundamental freedoms.207
It is tempting to view the exceptions for journalists and employee whistleblowers in
Ontario’s regulation as a means of narrowing the restriction on expression so that the law only
impairs rights minimally.208 Recall that where an employee of an animal use facility gained entry
to that facility based on false pretences, they are not deemed to have trespassed, provided they
document harm to an animal and immediately turn it over to authorities. 209 As explained, this
obligation, or quick report requirement, by preventing the documentation of systemic and repeated
patterns of abuse, undermines the reason for going undercover on a farm. As for journalists, they
are only exempt where they do not cause harm to an animal, to food safety, or to an individual. 210
But the term “harm to an individual” is defined as “emotional or psychological injury, including
undue stress.”211 It is difficult to imagine the negative press that results from an exposé disclosing
animal mistreatment not causing some kind of psychological injury or stress to the individuals
involved. Further, the regular work of industrial animal agriculture necessarily harms—and, where
meat is concerned, kills—animals. Thus, the exceptions, limited as they are, do little to minimize
the rights infringements inherent in Ontario’s law.
Finally, Ontario’s legislation is extremely broad in application. The regulation defines farm
animal, with whom individuals are prohibited from interacting, 212 as animals bred for a number of
purposes including “to propel vehicles” (i.e. carriage horses), “to be ridden for pleasure” (i.e.
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horses ridden recreationally), “to be shown publicly…” (for example, at a petting zoo), and “to
undertake competitions” (i.e. race horses).213 None of these activities form part of the food system.
In characterizing the places these kinds of animals are kept as those where trespassing risks
compromising biosecurity and food safety, the legislation overreaches, or impairs rights more than
is necessary. A law genuinely aimed at protecting farmer safety and the food system would stop
at the borders of personal property and food production and would limit speech only as much as
necessary to achieve those objectives. The real possibility of less impairing measures thus makes
clear that both Ontario’s and Alberta’s legislation fails the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes
test. This failure, either alone or in conjunction with the absence of a rational connection, is enough
for a court to declare the legislation of no force or effect. But in the interests of being
comprehensive, the following part will briefly weigh the effects of the legislation.
6 The Legislation is Not Proportionate in its Effects
The final stage of the Oakes test asks “whether the Charter infringement is too high a price
to pay for the benefit of the law.”214 Here, the positive and negative impacts of an impugned
measure are weighed, and the requirement of proportionality is met when the positive effects
outweigh the negative. While courts have varied in their emphasis on this part of the analysis, and
some scholars have questioned its utility,215 a majority of the Supreme Court has emphasized its
importance. In Hutterian Brethren, Chief Justice McLachlin not only confirmed that the
proportionality of effects test is integral to section 1, but also clarified the rationale of the analysis,
as well as the meaning of the salutary and deleterious effects to be balanced. Accordingly, whereas
the earlier stages of the Oakes test—pressing and substantial objective, rational connection, and
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minimal impairment—“are anchored in an assessment of the law’s purpose,”216 the fourth stage
takes full account of the “severity of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or
groups.”217 In other words, as it examines the impacts of legislation on their own, and not in
connection with the legislative objective, the proportionality of effects test involves a more
subjective assessment than the preceding inquiries.
Salutary effects are straightforward; they are the beneficial effects of the legislation in
question. As Hogg suggested, they will typically align with the legislative objective, already
accepted as pressing and substantial. 218 With respect to Canadian ag-gag laws, then, the benefits
would, assuming these objectives were accepted by a court, align with the goals of protecting the
safety of farmers and their property and guarding against the introduction of biosecurity threats to
the food system by trespassers and activists outside of slaughterhouses.
Deleterious effects are less clear cut and, as with much analysis under the Charter, vary
according to the case and the seriousness of the limit in question. Referring to a restriction on
religious freedom, Chief Justice McLachlin wrote, “[there] is no magic barometer to measure the
seriousness of a particular limit…” and that seriousness will depend on the nature of the practice. 219
The same, of course, might be said about freedom of expression, with the effect that limits to
political speech—that is, the type of expression limited by ag-gag laws—should be viewed as
particularly severe. Indeed, where constitutional protections are concerned, “no lie is more
valuable than the lie that enables important speech on issues of public concern.” 220 The negative
effects of Canadian ag-gag laws, in other words, are considerable.
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Chief Justice McLachlin further suggested that the evaluation of a law’s deleterious effects
will depend on its impacts “in terms of Charter values, such as liberty, human dignity, equality,
autonomy, and the enhancement of democracy.”221 As seen, ag-gag laws constitute a restriction on
political speech—that is, speech meant to enhance democracy. Moreover, for many animal rights
activists, their commitment to their cause may be comparable to religious or conscientious
beliefs,222 such that limits on their ability to manifest their beliefs through activism constitute an
affront to their liberty and dignity. Where ag-gag laws are in force, animal rights activists have a
choice between getting their message out and facing possible penalties, on the one hand, or
remaining silent in the face of the unspeakable violence animals experience on industrial farms, in
transport, and in slaughter, on the other.223 This is not a “meaningful choice.”224 Instead, as Justice
LeBel reasoned, dissenting in Hutterian Brethren, “when significant sacrifices have to be made to
[exercise constitutional freedoms] in the face of a state imposed burden, the choice to [do so] is no
longer uncoerced.”225 Add to this the idea that undercover investigations and slaughterhouse
protests are some of the only ways to bring to light the suffering of farmed animals, and the weight
of the negative impacts of ag-gag legislation becomes very clear. Proportionality of effects is a
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subjective inquiry. But surely, the absence of a meaningful choice, combined with restrictions on
political speech and the related impacts on activists’ liberty and dignity, outweigh any salutary
effects of Canadian ag-gag legislation.
Conclusion
This article completes the argument that Canadian ag-gag legislation, recently adopted in
a number of Canadian jurisdictions, constitutes a restriction on the constitutional right to freedom
of expression that cannot be justified under section 1 of the Charter. After reviewing the ways that
prohibitions on entry under false pretences and interference with motor vehicles transporting
farmed animals limit high-value political speech—the kind of speech that lies at the heart of the
guarantee—the article sets out the challenges that governments might face in attempting to justify
the restrictions under the section 1 Oakes test. This is not a novel story, but one that has already
played out south of the border. American ag-gag legislation dates to the early 1990s and has taken
many forms—from rarely used food libel laws, also known as “agricultural disparagement
statutes,” to prohibitions on non-consensual recording on farms, to prohibitions on entry under
false pretences,226 similar to those that I have scrutinized here. Indeed, where ag-gag laws are
concerned, legislators seem influenced by cross-border policies in both directions. Where
Canadian trespass laws originated in the US, the transport related provisions in Alberta, Ontario,
and Manitoba have now been exported to Iowa as well. 227
As discussed above, and elsewhere,228 all of these laws, in both Canada and the United
States, were drafted in response to the activities of undercover journalists, whistleblowers, and
animal rights activists who have made visible what the corporate animal agriculture industry
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wishes to hide.229 Moreover, in the United States, as seen, many of these statutes—particularly
those that mirror the ones at issue here—have been ruled unconstitutional for their interference
with the First Amendment right to free speech. Canadian ag-gag legislation, then, raises the same
contest of values between the goal of protecting a billion-dollar industry through secrecy and
concealment, on the one hand, and the pursuit of truth and information about important subjects
of public debate, on the other. While the legal approach may differ in Canada, given the that courts
tend to tolerate greater intrusions on free expression,230 my analysis suggests that the same interests
that prevailed in the United States should triumph here as well. Indeed, information about how
animals in the food system are treated is no less important to the Canadian public than to
Americans, and, as seen, the evidence connecting ag-gag legislation and its purported objectives
is equally weak on both sides of the border.
While protecting both the safety of farmers and the food system may be valid legislative
objectives, there is little evidence that these things are threatened by the kinds of animal activism
the legislation aims to prevent. Moreover, it is an open question whether protecting the economic
interests of industrial agriculture constitutes a pressing and substantial objective in line with the
Charter jurisprudence; there are compelling reasons that the economic protection of a billiondollar industry should not be permitted to trump the individual rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution, particularly when the rights in question are fundamental to citizen engagement
with and participation in democratic and political processes. At the level of rational connection,
neither the history nor the evidence supports the relationship between the prohibited expression—
entry onto farms and bearing witness on public roads—and the mischief being targeted; activists
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take steps to avoid harming both humans and nonhuman animals. The legislation is also not
minimally impairing; there are ways of achieving the stated objectives that do less harm to Charter
freedoms. In terms of proportionality of effects, the final stage of the section 1 analysis, legislators
behind Canadian ag-gag legislation have a difficult case to make. Ag-gag laws impact Charter
values in serious ways. For some activists who have made an ethical commitment to call out and
combat the incredible cruelty of industrial animal farming, the laws preclude a meaningful choice
between activists carrying out their conscientious beliefs and being charged and potentially
imprisoned (in Alberta) or fined. That absence of individual choice affects the dignity and
autonomy of people committed to challenging and changing the ways that we, as a society, relate
to nonhuman animals. These kinds of deleterious impacts will not be easily outweighed by the
purported objectives of Canadian ag-gag legislation.
Analyzing rights infringements using the section 1 Oakes framework has become a routine
part of constitutional adjudication and decision-making in Canada. But section 1 justification was
not always understood as a habitual or standard practice. Indeed, drafters of the Charter “envisaged
section 1 as a way of occasionally preserving the abilities of legislatures to determine the primacy
of particular values or policies….” 231 As Kent Roach has written, section 1 enables courts to
examine “adverse effects of laws in exceptional cases.”232 It does not empower governments to
trample on the civil liberties guaranteed by the Charter in order to immunize from public scrutiny
the hidden cruelty inherent in large-scale industrial animal farming. But in the years since its
adoption in 1982, and especially since the Oakes test was set out, “the Court has become
overwhelmingly deferential to governmental assertions about the importance and justification” of
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rights-infringing legislation,233 at the level of the legislative objective,234 and throughout the
remainder of the analysis. In ag-gag legislation, courts have a clear and straightforward opportunity
to re-establish the constitutional limits involved in policy-making that negatively affects highvalue expression.
This article focuses on the difficulties involved in justifying Canadian ag-gag legislation’s
impacts on the right to freedom of expression. But ag-gag laws provide an opportunity for other
constitutional inquiries and contributions to the literature on interpreting Charter protections and
raise important questions about the privileged treatment of the agriculture industry in Canada.
Future research will explore whether ag-gag laws also limit freedom of conscience, insofar as an
ethical commitment to nonviolent and respectful relationships with nonhuman animals might
qualify as a comprehensive belief system grounded in secular morality and deserving of the
protection of section 2(a) of the Charter. This is a particularly timely inquiry given parallel
developments in the United Kingdom and legal proceedings currently underway in Canada. 235
Moreover, as stated at the outset, there is a need for further critical inquiry into Canadian
agricultural exceptionalism, or the idea that, for a number of reasons, and as exemplified by aggag legislation, “regulators should treat agriculture as an exceptional sector.” 236 Indeed, privileged
protections for the industry appear to align with the increased concentration of the agri-food
industry and the rise of “Intensive Livestock Operations” in Canada, both of which merit scrutiny,
given the demonstrated negative impacts of intensive animal farming on human rights, health and
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safety, nonhuman animal interests, and the climate.237 For present purposes, however, the freedom
of expression and justification analyses are sufficient to raise significant red flags about both the
constitutionality and the general wisdom of Canadian ag-gag legislation.
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